Kaplan on Demonstratives. Demonstratives, Indexicals, Pure Indexicals. The best way to start is to get clear on Kaplan’s terminology. Indexicals. Indexicals are words whose meaning depends on context. Kaplan distinguishes between pure indexicals (e.g. I, here, now) and true demonstratives (e.g. that. had written out the formal semantics for my Logic of Demonstratives. David Kaplan is writing at 10 A.M. on 3/26/77, or (ii) the ‘proposition’ that David. Kaplan .
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Recall from section 2e that Kaplan argued against utterance-based theories precisely on the grounds that such theories predicted that arguments like this are invalid, because there are utterances of 38 in which the utterance of the premise is true, but the utterance of the conclusion false if it turns suddenly very noisy halfway through the utterance of 38for example.
For indexical expressions, in contrast, the symbolic meaning of the expression type is only part of the meaning of each individual token of that type.
The Semantics and Pragmatics of Complex Demonstratives. Suppose Kaplan utters both 16 and Occurrences, like types, but unlike tokens, are abstract. See instead the entry on propositional attitude reports.
Philosophical Studies The referential content of an utterance of an NA indexical is fixed automatically to some feature of the narrow context. According to Kaplan, utterance-based theories do not provide laplan resources to explain the logical properties of indexicals and demonstratives.
Reference Fixing for True Demonstratives In order to address the first of the two challenges above posed by true demonstratives—that of how to incorporate into the formal theory whatever is required to fix the reference of a particular use of a demonstrative—we must first determine what in fact fixes the reference of a use of demonstrative.
For example, suppose that Mary sees Bill and only Bill. The constituents of this proposition are Tally and the property of being a dog. Relative to this context, the two sentences that Kripke has uttered express the following propositions:.
The demonstration determines a demonstrated object a demonstra tum in a context, and the demonstratum is the referent of the demonstrative, in the context. Kaplan b and John Perry respond to Fregean criticisms of Kaplan’s theory demontratives criticize Frege’s theory of demonstratives.
David Kaplan, Demonstratives – PhilArchive
The arguments for and against these views are complicated. Each LD structure contains a set of contexts, a set of worlds, a set of individuals, a set of positions common to all worldsa set of times common to all worldsand a function that assigns to each predicate and individual constant an intension, which is a function from time-world pairs to extensions.
That is some reason to think that complex demonstratives are singular terms. Nevertheless, this is a strong form of descriptivism. The second distinction Perry makes in his account of semantic uses of context in the interpretation of indexicals is between kinds of indexicals. University of Minnesota Press. My utterance in this case would not be informative. It follows that two sentences that differ only in so far as one contains one of these indexicals where the other sentence contains the other indexical will express the same proposition relative to any context relative to which the two indexicals have the same content.
Below is a list of types of expressions for which contextualist theories have been proposed, along with some discussion.
These will vary from one token to another. Then 26 is true with respect to certain sequences of contexts that have different demonstrata. It is controversial how these uses of he and she are related to their demonstrative uses.
Singular-term theories of complex demonstratives must deal with two major issues. Thus Kaplan concludes that she can know a priori the proposition that she exists.
The claim that natural language does not include monsters is a matter of debate in current philosophy and linguistics. This sort of double-relativization is often called double-indexing. The disquotation test, however, is controversial. References and Further Reading Bach, Kent. As a result, for any context c relative to which two indexicals refer to the same thing, the two indexicals have the same content.
These alternatives usually take one of two forms: Philosophers of language commonly distinguish between the meaning of a linguistic expression and its referent. John starts to believe that property only after he has searched for the messy shopper. The most common objection arises from considering various technologies that we use in communication.
This suggests that Lewis would analyze the notion of believing something that is true demonstratves some notion like that of believing something truly. On Kaplan’s informal semantics, propositions have constituent structures that resemble the constituent structures of sentences: Suppose that Bertrand Russell utters This is the characteristic feature of indexicals, and it is inherited by any expression that contains an indexical.
Indexicals (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Despite the importance of demonsttratives between occurrences and tokens, there are systematic relations between them. Thus direct reference theories, together with the earlier assumptions about the connection of semantics with belief, imply that agents with indexical beliefs believe singular propositions.
The difference between indexical expressions and non-indexical expressions is in the meanings of individual tokens. But Perry also recognizes a distinct variety of content expressed by the utterance: In the other role, it represents the actual or counterfactual circumstance relative to which we evaluate the proposition expressed. Such phrases are usually called complex demonstratives. Literal MeaningCambridge: Objections to Utterance-based Theories The theories of Reichenbach and Burks and probably Russell as well are clear cases of what was called, in the introduction to this section, utterance-based semantic theories of indexicals.
The focal demonstratum of a context is simply one member of the sequence of demonstrata.